USA v. Jerrod Curtis by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-10-2014 
USA v. Jerrod Curtis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jerrod Curtis" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 944. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/944 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4149 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JERROD CURTIS, 
      Appellant 
     
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  3-07-cr-00214-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 8, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 10, 2014) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant Jerrod Curtis claims the District Court committed procedural error in  
revoking his supervised release. For the reasons set forth below, we will reject Curtis’s 
arguments and will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
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I. Factual Background 
 
 While on supervised release for a previous federal conviction, Curtis was arrested 
at the house where he was staying in connection with a drug sting. Police found heroin, 
brass knuckles, and firearm ammunition in the house. Curtis was then charged in a 
Pennsylvania state court with “Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, 
Criminal Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Deliver Heroin, and Criminal Use of a 
Communication Facility.” (App. 91.) Curtis pleaded guilty to the third charge, Criminal 
Use of a Communication Facility, and as a result was sentenced to time served and two 
years of probation.  
 Based on these charges, the U.S. Probation Office contended that Curtis violated 
three conditions of his supervised release by: committing a state crime involving a 
controlled substance offense, associating with a known felon, and possessing firearm 
ammunition as well as a pair of brass knuckles. (App. 91-92.) At the revocation hearing, 
Curtis admitted to being in possession of brass knuckles, associating with a known felon, 
and acting in violation of the state crime against Criminal Use of a Communication 
Facility, but denied the remaining charges.  
 Two factual disputes arose during the revocation hearing. The first was whether 
Curtis distributed, and/or possessed with intent to distribute, drugs, and the second was 
whether Curtis possessed firearm ammunition in addition to the admitted brass knuckles. 
(App. 25.) The District Court revoked Curtis’s supervised release, finding that he had 
committed all the alleged violations. (App. 67-69.) The District Court then sentenced 
Curtis to 22 months of imprisonment. (App. 72.) 
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II. Discussion 
 
 A district court’s decision to revoke supervised release must be based on a finding 
that the defendant, according to a preponderance of the evidence, violated a condition of 
supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review that decision “for abuse of 
discretion.  However, the factual findings supporting that decision are reviewed for clear 
error; legal issues are subject to de novo review.” United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 
350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 Curtis appeals the revocation of his supervised release on one basis, namely, that 
the District Court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B). 
That rule states that “[a]t sentencing the court . . . must—for any disputed portion of the 
presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a 
ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the 
court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Curtis contends that the District Court 
did not rule on certain factual disputes at the revocation hearing: (1) whether Curtis 
possessed and/or distributed heroin; and (2) whether he possessed the firearm 
ammunition. At the outset, it is not clear whether Rule 32(i)(3)(B) applies to revocation 
hearings. Even assuming arguendo that it does apply here, the District Court properly 
followed the rule in this case.    
 In United States v. Fumo, we found that the District Court abused its discretion 
when it failed to resolve a specific factual dispute as required by Rule 32.  655 F.3d 288 
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There, the District Court said “because 
of the complexity of the . . . argument . . . I felt I could not properly resolve it before 
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sentencing. Rather than postpone the sentencing, I declined to rule on it.”  Id. at 310-11. 
We found that “[a] district court should not refuse to find or calculate a loss because of 
the complexity of the dispute or because spending the time to resolve the dispute might 
delay sentencing.” Id. at 311. Accordingly, we found reversible error by the district court.                                                                                                               
 By contrast, here the District Court resolved all cited factual disputes at the 
revocation hearing. The District Court noted that “[t]he evidence is both direct and 
circumstantial that” Curtis used a communication facility, that 170 bags of heroin were 
found in his house, that he associated with a convicted felon, and that “there was a pair of 
brass knuckles and that there [were] rounds of ammunition.” (App. 67-68.)  In 
conjunction with witness testimony, the Court thereby found Curtis committed a Grade A 
violation of his conditions of supervised release, i.e., a controlled substance offense. 
When asked by the Government to clarify whether the District Court found “in fact, [that 
Curtis] committed . . . a controlled substance offense,” the Court responded affirmatively. 
(App. 68-69.) In imposing Curtis’s sentence, the Court explicitly stated that “he engaged 
in serious drug-dealing activities.” (App. 72.) In addition, the Court found that Curtis 
possessed firearm ammunition, specifically, that “the evidence is beyond a reasonable 
doubt with regard to [the possession of firearm ammunition].” (App. 68.) 
 Thus, the Court did, in fact, rule that Curtis committed a controlled substance 
offense, and that he possessed firearm ammunition. In doing so, the Court necessarily 
rejected Curtis’s arguments that the drugs and firearm ammunition in the house did not 
belong to him. Therefore, the District Court was not in violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B).  
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III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
